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FOREWARNED WAR: THE TARGETING OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFTS 
IN SOUTH AMERICA AND THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
SYSTEM 
Alonso Gurmendi Dunkelberg* 
Throughout the War on Drugs, South American govern-
ments have fought a difficult and many times losing battle 
against drug trafficking. Lack of resources and policing ca-
pabilities have lead a growing number of States to adopt so 
called “Shoot-Down Laws”, legislation designed to author-
ize use of lethal force against “hostile” aircraft suspected of 
being involved in narco-trafficking. This article examines 
said laws from the viewpoint of international law, humani-
tarian law and human rights law. The article makes the point 
that mere transportation of narcotics cannot be reason 
enough to authorize use of lethal force and that “Shoot-
Down Laws” constitute both a violation of the right to life 
and a misuse of the law of armed conflict to justify military 
action against civilian aircraft. The article claims that other 
alternatives, such as closer bilateral cooperation and en-
forcement, must be explored if these governments want to 
avoid being sued for human rights violations at the Inter-
American level. 
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People in South America have a saying: ‘Guerra avisada no 
mata gente,’ which roughly translates to ‘a forewarned war never 
kills anyone.’ It is a call for preparedness for an upcoming and una-
voidable evil. He who takes early precautions for a known misfor-
tune will no longer suffer its consequences in the future. It is the 
South American equivalent to the old adage that ‘knowing is half 
the battle,’ or as Latin Americans would have it, the entire war. This 
paper will analyze one such example of a forewarned calamity. One 
not related to war though, but to the misuse of the law of war, or 
international humanitarian law -as it is also called- by South Amer-
ican governments in the fight against narco-traffic. 
Countries in South America face a steep challenge to curb the 
spread of drug production within their borders. Inaccessible jungles 
and lack of resources prevent law enforcement agencies from carry-
ing out normal policing actions in drug producing regions. In such 
areas, organized criminal groups operate with fair amounts of impu-
nity, sometimes even guarded by insurgent groups or mercenary 
forces. Because of this, cocaine production in the region has re-
mained stable, despite international efforts and considerable funds 
invested to stop it. 
In order to counter this trend, since the early nineties, up to five 
different South American states have legislated with regards to what 
they call “leyes de derribo”, which literally translates to “Shoot-
Down” laws. These laws, in essence, authorize the use of deadly 
force against civilian aircraft suspected of being involved in narco-
trafficking. Its defenders claim that such a measure is the only thing 
that can guarantee the rule of law in South American jungles. 
In this article, I will argue against these laws both from a legal 
and a policy perspective. From a legal point of view, I maintain that 
use of lethal force against civilian –albeit criminal– aircraft consti-
tutes both a violation of the international law of civilian aviation as 
well as human rights law. Specifically, I take issue with the blatant 
manipulation of law of war concepts of “hostilities” and “hostile 
acts” employed by these laws. From a policy perspective, I will ar-
gue that any perceived advantage that the downing of suspicious air-
craft might create, would be offset by the unintended consequence 
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of empowering domestic armed groups, which will be now in charge 
of protecting drug caravans through the jungle to the detriment of 
local civilian populations. 
If fully applied, it is only a matter of time before these laws reach 
international fora, where they will be rapidly, and swiftly, declared 
contrary to international law. This is, with all certainty, a forewarned 
war, and one that South American governments are destined to lose. 
Instead of stubbornly pursuing a legally unsound course of action, 
South American governments should increase multilateral coopera-
tion and establish multilateral agreements that allow them to tackle 
the problem of narco-trafficking within the framework of human 
rights law. Not doing so will simply mean legal defeat at the hands 
of human rights law, which in turn would spike the growing anti-
human rights rhetoric already prevalent in the South-American sub-
continent. These problems are entirely predictable and avoidable. 
“Guerra avisada no mata gente.” 
1. THE SOUTH AMERICAN DRUG MARKET 
Before I can explain the legal issues affecting “Shoot-Down” 
laws, it is important to first understand the underlying problem of 
the drugs that birthed them. The drug problem in South America is 
that of cocaine. Currently, the 132,300 hectares of cocaine bush cul-
tivation areas in the world are distributed between just three coun-
tries: Colombia (52%), Peru (32%) and Bolivia (15%).1 These three 
countries produce an estimated 943 tons of cocaine every year, with 
authorities being able to intercept between 43 and 68% each year 
(i.e. between 405 and 641 tons per year).2  It is estimated that the 
U.S. –the largest cocaine consumption market in the world- needs 
only 196 tons to satisfy its demand.3 Thus, even assuming authori-
                                                                                                             
 1 World Drug Report 2016, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 35-36 (May 
2016), http://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_
web.pdf. 
 2 Id. at 36. 
 3 Keegan Hamilton, The Golden Age of Drug Trafficking: How Meth, Co-
caine, and Heroin Move Around the World, VICE NEWS (Apr. 25, 2016), https://n
ews.vice.com/article/drug-trafficking-meth-cocaine-heroin-global-drug-smuggli
ng. 
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ties manage to intercept its maximum load of 641 tons, narco-traf-
fickers would still possess 302 tons; more than enough to satisfy 
their American consumers. The South American cocaine flow there-
fore consists of making sure that at least 196 tons out of those 943 
produced get safely to the U.S. and send any surplus to Europe and 
Brazil. 
“Shoot-Down” laws were created as a law enforcement tool for 
South American nations to disrupt this drug trail through the de-
struction of airplanes carrying processed cocaine to other points of 
embarkation. It is important to note, however, that while in the early 
days of the drug business, cocaine smuggling in direct flights from 
the Andes to the United States was possible, increased demand and 
more stringent airport and airline controls have rendered this option 
impractical, if not virtually impossible. “Shoot-Down” laws are thus 
not meant to address any form of large cargo planes, but rather small 
bi-rotor airplanes that engage in short flights from one country to 
another in specific portions of an otherwise longer trip. 
Drug transportation is a complex and time consuming endeavor, 
requiring the moving of large quantities of merchandise through 
several different countries. This task, therefore, is much better suited 
for maritime transportation, where larger quantities can be moved 
than by air. In fact, according to a 2010 United Nations report, co-
caine is typically transported from Colombia to Mexico or Central 
America by sea and then onwards by land to the United States and 
Canada, with 90% of cocaine leaving from Colombia via either the 
Pacific or the Atlantic sea-routes; and 10% via Venezuela, through 
the use of aircraft.4 It would thus be an over-simplification and a 
mistake to state that shooting down planes is an essential component 
to fighting the spread of drugs in the world. Rather, airplanes play a 
very specific role in very specific stages of the cocaine flow. In order 
to understand which, one has to properly understand the cocaine 
trail. 
                                                                                                             
 4 The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat As-
sessment, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 87-88 (June 2010), https://www.u
nodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pd
f; see also Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Carib-
bean: A Threat Assessment, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 32 (Sept. 2012), 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_
America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf. 
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Cocaine usually starts its life as a coca leaf on a plantation, typ-
ically in the Peruvian VRAEM region,5 but also in southwestern Co-
lombia or central Bolivia. Peruvian coca leaves and coca paste must 
then be shipped to cocaine production areas in Bolivia and Colom-
bia. Once in Colombia, cocaine is transported by sea in semi-sub-
mersible vessels or so-called “go-fast” boats hopping through the 
coast of Panama until they get to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.6 In these 
countries, cocaine is moved onwards in a wide set of air, land, and 
sea transports to Honduras, where it meets with air-transported co-
caine coming directly from Venezuela and ultimately imported to 
Guatemala, where flows are bottlenecked for later land transporta-
tion into Mexico and the United States.7 
On this route, aircraft are mostly relevant in two points of the 
trip: (i) transportation of coca paste to Bolivia and Colombia and (ii) 
transportation of cocaine from Venezuela to Honduras. In both of 
these cases, however, the choice of air transportation does not seem 
to respond to any specific need other than expediency. If denied ac-
cess to air transport, traffickers would likely be able to devise alter-
native transportation mechanisms. 
Take for example the situation in Venezuela, which is becoming 
a larger hub for cocaine shipments to Central America over the years 
not because it is a more convenient route, but mainly because of 
porous law enforcement. According to a 2016 Department of State 
Report, “public corruption is a major problem in Venezuela that 
makes it easier for drug-trafficking organizations to move and 
smuggle illegal drugs.”8  In fact, according to the Department of 
State, “[c]redible reporting indicates that individual members of the 
                                                                                                             
 5 VRAEM is a Spanish acronym for “Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y 
Mantaro.” Jose Luis Pardo & Alejandra S. Inzunza, Peru’s VRAEM Region: The 
Home of Miss Coca, INSIGHT CRIME (June 17, 2014), http://www.insightcrime.o
rg/news-analysis/perus-vraem-region-the-home-of-miss-coca. 
 6 Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A 
Threat Assessment, supra note 4, at 32-40. 
 7 Id. 
 8 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug & Chemical Con-
trol, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AFFAIRS 296 (Mar. 2016), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/253655
.pdf. 
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government and security forces [are] engaged in or facilitated drug 
trafficking activities.”9 
In the case of Peruvian traffic to Bolivia and Colombia, if denied 
air transportation capabilities, Peruvian narco-traffickers would en-
gage in land transportation. This, in fact, has already happened. Ac-
cording to the Department of State, since early 2015, just a few 
months before the approval of Peru’s “Shoot-Down” law10 aerial ac-
tivities in coca producing regions declined due to increased military 
and police activity, aggressive destruction of clandestine airstrips 
and the installation of radar facilities.11  In response, trafficking or-
ganizations simply began moving cocaine base overland to clandes-
tine airfields further east, closer to Bolivia.12 
2. THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Civilian Aircraft are specifically protected by customary law and 
applicable treaties, such as the 1944 Chicago Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation.13 These norms reflect an international legal 
order profoundly concerned with the safety of civilian air traffic. 
While international law does give States the option of requiring an 
unauthorized aircraft to land at an airport of choosing, it does not 
authorize use of force, except in instances of self-defense.14 Thus, 
under Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention, States must “refrain 
from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft in flight 
[and], in case of interception, the lives of persons on board and the 
safety of aircraft must not be endangered.”15 
                                                                                                             
 9 Id. at 16. 
 10 Ley No. 30339, Aug. 29, 2015, Diario Oficial El Peruano [D.O.] (Peru). 
 11 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Drug & Chemical Con-
trol, supra note 8, at 250. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See generally Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 
U.N.T.S. 295. 
 14 Protocol to the Convention on International Civil Rights, art. 3bis, May 10, 
1984, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (“[t]his provision shall not be interpreted as modifying in 
any way the rights and obligations of States set forth in the Charter of the United 
Nations.”). 
 15 Id. 
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Article 3bis was negotiated in the wake of the downing of Ko-
rean Airlines Flight 007 in 1983, when a Soviet fighter mistook it 
for a spy-plane.16 Member States to the Chicago Convention met in 
April 1984, in Montreal, to negotiate a new clause for the Conven-
tion to specifically address the protections afforded to civilian air-
craft.17 
At the negotiating table, most parties were in agreement that 
their task was merely to codify an already existing customary legal 
regime. In his Opening Statement during the First Plenary Meeting, 
the Acting President of the Assembly confidently affirmed that 
“[t]here is no doubt that these humanitarian principles concerning 
the protection of human life are deeply rooted in customary interna-
tional law.”18 His main motivation for the meeting was his belief 
that “[a] written rule of law is far superior to general principles rec-
ognized as customary law because frequently the very existence of 
a customary law or its exact scope and content may remain subject 
to challenge.”19 These thoughts were echoed by other delegations 
present in Montreal. The Chief Delegate of the United Kingdom 
added that “the development of international law, particularly dur-
ing this century, has made it clear beyond doubt that in time of 
peace, the use of force against civil aircraft is subject to very severe 
limitations.”20 Discussions at the Montreal meeting mostly revolved 
around the actual necessity to amend the Chicago Convention, not 
the existence of a rule of international law banning use of force 
against civilian aircraft.21 
For the negotiating States at the Montreal meeting, self-defense 
was the only acceptable reason for using force against a civilian air-
craft.22 This authorization, however, was to be construed narrowly. 
The delegation of Belgium, for example, stated that the notion of 
                                                                                                             
 16 Thom Patterson, The Downing of Flight 007: 30 Years Later, a Cold War 
Tragedy Still Seems Surreal, CNN (Aug. 31, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/
08/31/us/kal-fight-007-anniversary/. 
 17 See generally Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Assembly 25th Session Ple-
nary Meetings, ICAO Doc. 9437-A25-Res., P-min. (Apr. 24 - May 10, 1984) [
hereinafter ICAO 25th Session]. 
 18 Id. at 20. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 27. 
 21 Id. at 26-27. 
 22 ICAO 25th Session, supra note 17, at 29. 
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self-defense should be limited to extreme cases and that it had to be 
exercised in good faith and be commensurate with the attack.23 The 
United Kingdom also clarified that “you cannot kill a trespasser un-
less he poses an imminent threat to your life.”24 It even stressed that: 
If the aircraft merely enters the State’s airspace with-
out permission, whether by mistake or deliberately, 
there can be no justification for using force against 
it, even if it is being used for activities inconsistent 
with its status as a civil aircraft. Provided it is not 
endangering the lives of persons not on board, the use 
of force against it cannot be regarded as permissi-
ble.25 
The legal regime recognized at Montreal is thus fairly straight-
forward: A State may not use force against a civilian aircraft save in 
cases of self-defense, whether within the meaning of Article 51 of 
the UN Charter, or as a means of protecting individuals not on board 
the intercepted plane. These two instances relate to the right to self-
defense both in terms of the jus ad bellum and human rights law. I 
will analyze both concepts below. 
a) Self-Defense and the Jus Ad Bellum 
At the time of the Montreal conference, the delegation of New 
Zealand was one of the few Western States to take a critical view of 
mentioning self-defense as an authorization for the use of force 
against civilian aircraft. For New Zealand, “it was impossible . . . 
that civil aviation could ever give rise to circumstances in which 
self-defence could be justified.”26 In its view, an aircraft engaged in 
civil aviation was unable to carry out or participate in an armed at-
tack, and thus could not be able to trigger Article 51 of the UN Char-
ter.27 
Such a determination seemed accurate. Ten years prior to the 
Montreal meeting, the UN General Assembly had defined “aggres-
sion” as “the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
                                                                                                             
 23 Id. at 71. 
 24 Id. at 29. 
 25 Id. at 30. 
 26 Id. at 106. 
 27 ICAO 25th Session, supra note 17, at 107. 
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territorial integrity or political independence of another State.”28 
This definition was quickly understood to inform the requirements 
for self-defense against an armed attack under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter,29 something that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
would ultimately confirm in its decision in the Military and Para-
military Activities in and Against Nicaragua case a mere seven 
months after the Montreal meeting.30 Such a definition of self-de-
fense clearly restricted it to armed attacks carried out by States, not 
private actors or civilian aircraft. Nowadays, however, in this post-
9/11 world, the situation has become somewhat less straightforward. 
Immediately after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the United Nations 
Security Council passed Resolution No. 1368.31 The resolution’s 
third perambulatory clause specifically recognized the application 
of the “inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in ac-
cordance with the Charter.”32 This was the first time that such a right 
had been invoked for an armed attack launched by a non-state actor, 
such as al-Qaeda. Such a recognition was the starting point for what 
has become a vigorous and challenging debate within the interna-
tional legal community as to whether self-defense against a non-
state actor can be invoked as a justification for the use of force in 
the territory of another State. 
Up until this point, all prior precedents such as Israel’s actions 
against the Palestine Liberation Organization in Tunisia in 1985, had 
been met with strong condemnation by the international commu-
nity.33 Under the prevailing view of the time, as explained by the 
ICJ in its Nicaragua decision, a non-state actor could only engage in 
an armed attack if such an attack could be attributed to another 
state.34 For attribution to exist, the state had to exercise effective 
                                                                                                             
 28 G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 143 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
 29 David Luban, Just War and Human Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 160, 161-
62 (1980). 
 30 See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicara-
gua (Nica. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1984, I.C.J. Rep. 70. (Nov. 26) (Jurisdiction of the 
Court and Admissibility of the Application). 
 31 S.C. Res. 1368, (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 32 Id. 
 33 S.C. Res. 573, (Oct. 4, 1985). 
 34 Nica. v. U.S., supra note 30, at ¶ 195. 
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control over the military or paramilitary operations to a degree that 
exceeds mere logistical support.35 
Since 9/11, and in some cases even since as far back as the late 
nineties, this position has been increasingly challenged both in liter-
ature and by state practice.36 Cases of States attacking non-state ac-
tors in the territory of another state now include the United States’ 
ongoing airstrikes against al-Qaeda in Pakistan and ISIS in Syria, 
Israel’s 2006 attack against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Russia’s 2007 
attack against Chechen rebels in Georgia, Turkey’s 2007 attack 
against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and Colombia’s 2008 attack 
against FARC terrorists in Ecuador.37 Some sectors of the interna-
tional legal community also seem to be leaning towards a new un-
derstanding of armed attack that accepts the use of force in response 
to an attack by a non-state armed force in such instances where the 
host state is either unwilling or unable to address the threat.38 
The so-called “unwilling or unable standard” however has re-
ceived strong criticism in scholarship39 and has thus far been unable 
to consolidate as a serious legal theory in today’s jus ad bellum.40 If 
anything, the ICJ has continued to apply its restrictive approach to 
the use of force in its subsequent case law. For instance, in its 2005 
decision for the Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo case, 
the ICJ rejected Uganda’s claim that its attack on the Allied Demo-
cratic Forces (ADF) armed group within the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) was an example of self-defense. The Court said: 
                                                                                                             
 35 See id. at ¶¶ 109-15 (detailing account of pre-9/11 jus ad bellum); see gen-
erally Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. 
L. 359 (2009). 
 36 Tams, supra note 35, at 380. 
 37 Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare and the Right to Self-
Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 246 (2011). 
 38 Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Towards a Normative Framework 
for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. 483, 503 (2012). 
 39 Kevin Jon Heller, Ashley Deeks’ Problematic Defense of the “Unwilling 
or Unable” Test, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 15, 2011), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/15/
ashley-deeks-failure-to-defend-the-unwilling-or-unable-test/ (arguing that propo-
nents of the unwilling or unable standard have been unable to offer a careful anal-
ysis of state practice and opinion juris). 
 40 Tams, supra note 35, at 382 (arguing that “states and courts have been clear 
[in that] they have treated the new practice under the rubric of self-defence, and 
have not ‘invented’ new exceptions to the use of force.”). 
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[W]hile Uganda claimed to have acted in self-de-
fense, it did not ever claim that it had been subjected 
to an armed attack by the armed forces of the DRC. 
The ‘armed attacks’ to which reference was made 
came rather from the ADF. The Court has found 
above ( . . . ) that there is no satisfactory proof of the 
involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the 
Government of the DRC. The attacks did not ema-
nate from armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC 
or on behalf of the DRC ( . . . ). The Court is of the 
view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series 
of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumula-
tive in character, they still remained non-attributable 
to the DRC. For all these reasons, the Court finds that 
the legal and factual circumstances for the exercise 
of a right of self-defence by Uganda against the DRC 
were not present.41 
This is a clear restatement of the “effective control” standard set 
out in the Nicaragua case two decades before.42 The ADF, on its 
own, was unable to commit an armed attack that could trigger 
Uganda’s right to self-defense under the UN Charter. 
This decision was not absent of controversy. ICJ Judge Bruno 
Simma even appended an individual opinion in which he criticized 
the Court’s “restrictive reading of Article 51.”43 For Judge Simma, 
“in the light of more recent developments not only in State practice 
but also with regard to accompanying opinion juris, [the interna-
tional law on self-defence] ought urgently be reconsidered.”44 Judge 
Kooijmans agreed with him, stating that whenever a government 
lacks almost all authority in a specific part of its territory, and 
“armed attacks are carried out by irregular bands from such territory 
against a neighbouring State, [then] they are still armed attacks even 
                                                                                                             
 41 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶¶ 146-47 (Dec. 19). 
 42 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, supra 
note 30, at ¶ 99. 
 43 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, supra note 42, at ¶ 11 
(separate opinion by Simma, J.). 
 44 Id. 
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if they cannot be attributed to the territorial State.”45 He thus con-
cluded that “[i]t would be unreasonable to deny the attacked State 
the right to self-defence merely because there is no attacker State, 
and the Charter does not so require.”46 
For the time being, however, the ICJ remains unconvinced by 
such arguments. And given its highly authoritative position within 
international law, the best one can say is that while the law is cur-
rently “in a state of flux”47 it still has not accepted any deviation 
from the traditional understanding of self-defense. This means, 
therefore, that Article 51 will continue to be restricted to armed ac-
tivities between states, even despite the growing trend of contrary 
scholarship.48 
If applied to the case of “Shoot-Down” laws, it is evident that 
mere possession of narcotics by a transnational criminal organiza-
tion (or the commission of any other such common crime, for that 
matter) would fall immensely below the threshold required to acti-
vate the right to self-defense under international law. Indeed, if the 
ICJ is still unable to accept that an organized armed group in control 
of part of the territory of another state waging war against the de-
fending state is still not sufficiently organized to commit an armed 
attack, then a transnational criminal gang operating from within the 
intercepting state and dedicated to the mere manufacture and 
transport of narcotics would be even less able to commit one. In 
simple terms, therefore, it would be impossible for a State to argue 
that it is authorized by the international law of self-defense to target 
and destroy a civilian aircraft transporting narcotics. New Zealand 
still prevails. 
b) Self-Defense and Human Rights 
Another case in which “Shoot-Down” laws may be legal is in 
cases where law enforcement officers need to use lethal force in or-
der to protect themselves or other citizens. In this version of self-
defense, jus ad bellum plays no part at all, and rather, human rights 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at ¶ 30 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.). 
 46 Id. 
 47 Tams, supra note 35, at 382. 
 48 See e.g. Monica Hakimi, Defensive Force Against Non-State Actors: The 
State of Play, 91 Int’l. L. Stud. 1, 6 (2015). 
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law does. Under human rights law, States have an obligation to re-
spect the right to life of its citizens. The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights affirms that “[e]very human being has the 
inherent right to life  . . .  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.”49 In the context of South America, the same is true for the 
American Convention on Human Rights. Article 4 states in similar 
terms that “[e]very person has the right to have his life respected  . . .  
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”50 
Human rights tribunals have interpreted the concept of “arbitrary 
deprivation of life” to great detail, determining that use of lethal 
force in times of peace is only legal if undertaken as a last resort. 
Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that 
“[t]he use of force by law enforcement officials must be defined by 
exceptionality and must be planned and proportionally limited by 
the authorities.”51 This means that lethal force must only be used “to 
the minimum extent possible in all circumstances and never exceed 
the use which is absolutely necessary in relation to the force or threat 
to be repealed”52 and that “force or coercive means can only be used 
once all other methods of control have been exhausted and have 
failed.”53 
The threshold of “absolute necessity” is shared by all major hu-
man rights institutions and is a very stringent limitation on law en-
forcement activity. For example, the UN Rapporteur on Extrajudi-
cial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions’ 2014 Report strictly stated 
that the principle that life must be protected “demands that lethal 
force may not be used intentionally merely to protect law and order 
or to serve other similar interests”, adding that “it may not be used 
only to disperse protests, to arrest a suspected criminal, or to safe-
guard other interests such as property  . . .  A fleeing thief who poses 
                                                                                                             
 49 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 50 United Nations American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, Nov. 22, 
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 51 Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 166, ¶ 83 (July 4, 2007). 
 52 Id. at ¶ 84 (internal quotations omitted). 
 53 Id. at ¶ 83. 
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no immediate danger may not be killed, even if it means that the 
thief will escape.”54 
This standard has been codified by the UN in what is known as 
the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law En-
forcement Officials, often referred to as the Basic Principles in 
short.55 Principle 9 restates the use of force standard as follows: 
Law enforcement officials shall not use firearms 
against persons except in self-defence or defence of 
others against the imminent threat of death or serious 
injury, to prevent the perpetration of a particularly 
serious crime involving grave threat to life, to arrest 
a person presenting such a danger and resisting their 
authority, or to prevent his or her escape, and only 
when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve 
these objectives. In any event, intentional lethal use 
of firearms may only be made when strictly unavoid-
able in order to protect life.56 
Under such rules, the transportation of narcotics falls flatly out-
side of any valid justification for the use of lethal force by law en-
forcement officials in self-defense. Mere commission of a non-vio-
lent crime cannot be disproportionately handled by law enforcement 
through lethal violent means without violating proportionality. Law 
enforcement officials intercepting narco-traffickers would require 
further action from the aircraft in question that puts their own life or 
the life of others in danger before actually opening fire. 
                                                                                                             
 54 Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 72, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/26/36, (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session26/Docume
nts/A-HRC-26-36_en.doc [hereinafter Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extraju-
dicial]. 
 55 See U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Of-
fenders, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement 
Officials (Aug. 27 - Sept. 7, 1990), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest
/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx. 
 56 Id. at ¶ 9. 
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3. MISUSE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
As I have shown above, use of lethal force against an aircraft 
suspected of transporting narcotic drugs is generally illegal under 
both jus ad bellum and human rights law. Law enforcement officials 
simply cannot engage civilian (albeit criminal) aircraft in such a 
way. It is because of this, however, that all “Shoot-Down” laws in 
South America include a provision that seeks to quite purposefully 
de-civilianize these criminal aircraft by means of declaring them 
“hostile.” Once hostility has been determined, these laws seek to 
pluck the aircraft from the reach of the Chicago Convention and in-
sert it within the scope of international humanitarian law (“IHL”)—
the body of laws that regulates the conduct of belligerents in an 
armed conflict. 
Under IHL, the legal regime applicable to the use of lethal force 
changes entirely, from one of absolute necessity, last resort, and 
self-defense to one of “status based targeting,” as it is called.57 Re-
duced to its simplest explanation, under status based targeting, par-
ties to an armed conflict are allowed to use lethal force against their 
enemy based solely on its identity as a participant in the conflict.58 
If the parties are two states—if the conflict is of an international 
character—then their soldiers are authorized by international law to 
open fire against anyone who qualifies as a combatant under the 
terms of the Third Geneva Convention.59 If the parties are a state 
and a non-state organized armed group—a non-international armed 
conflict—then government forces can use lethal force against any-
one directly participating in hostilities.60 In both cases, however, use 
of lethal force directly against innocent, or even indirectly partici-
pating civilians, is strictly forbidden.61 
                                                                                                             
 57 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 187 (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1st ed. 2010). 
 58 Id. at 188 (arguing that “[c]ombatants may be attacked at any time until 
they surrender or are otherwise hors de combat, and not only when actually threat-
ening the enemy.”). 
 59 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention 
(III)] 
 60 SOLIS, supra note 57, at 188.  
 61 Id.; see generally Geneva Convention (III), supra note 59 (civilians can, 
however, be the subject of non-intentional attack, as part of collateral damage for 
a proportional attack against a combatant). 
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The concept of direct participation in hostilities (“DPH”) is com-
plicated to grasp. Under IHL, DPH “refers to specific hostile acts 
carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of hostilities be-
tween parties to an armed conflict.”62 In order to qualify as DPH, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—an authori-
tative entity in the field of IHL—states that a specific act must: 
1. be likely to adversely affect the military operations 
or military capacity of a party to an armed conflict 
or, alternatively, to inflict death, injury, or destruc-
tion on persons or objects protected against direct at-
tack (threshold of harm), and 
2. there must be a direct causal link between the act 
and the harm likely to result either from that act, or 
from a coordinated military operation of which that 
act constitutes an integral part (direct causation), and 
3. the act must be specifically designed to directly 
cause the required threshold of harm in support of a 
party to the conflict and to the detriment of another 
(belligerent nexus).63 
Thus, for example, a farmer sympathetic to a rebel force who, 
upon seeing government forces, grabs a pistol and decides to open 
fire against them, immediately becomes a direct participant in hos-
tilities even if he never actually joined the rebel force in the first 
place. Indeed, he is inflicting death upon the specific soldiers, and, 
therefore, meets the threshold of harm: there is a direct causal link 
between his squeezing the trigger and the harm he is causing on the 
soldiers, and, he is acting specifically to benefit one side of the con-
flict and injure another, thus meeting the belligerent nexus require-
ment. 
                                                                                                             
 62 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS 45 (2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icr
c-002-0990.pdf. 
 63 Id. at 46. 
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The requirement of a belligerent nexus, however, is important. 
As stated by the ICRC, many activities during armed conflict cause 
harm and yet are not considered DPH. 
For example, the exchange of fire between police and 
hostage-takers during an ordinary bank robbery, vio-
lent crimes committed for reasons unrelated to the 
conflict, and the stealing of military equipment for 
private use, may cause the required threshold of 
harm, but are not specifically designed to support a 
party to the conflict by harming another.64 
Under such a framework, therefore, a narco-trafficking organi-
zation committing common crimes in the course of an armed con-
flict would not generally be engaging in DPH, unless it specifically 
decided to engage in violence in support of the rebel group opposing 
the government. Moreover, management of a drug smuggling busi-
ness as a means of financing an insurgent group would not count as 
direct participation either. As stated by the ICRC, “the financing or 
production of weapons and the provision of food to the armed forces 
may be indispensable, but not directly causal, to the subsequent in-
fliction of harm.”65 
This idea of a belligerent nexus, however, brings forth an im-
portant reality of all “Shoot-Down” laws: of the five South Ameri-
can nations that have regulated them, only one—Colombia—is cur-
rently engaged in an armed conflict of any sort. Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, 
and Venezuela are simply managing domestic crime, not an armed 
conflict.66 This means, therefore, that save for the case of Colombia, 
talking of hostile aircraft in these countries is simply an absurd legal 
impossibility because there are no hostilities in which to participate 
directly in. Indeed, as stated by the ICRC: 
The notion of direct participation in hostilities essen-
tially comprises two elements, namely that of ‘hos-
tilities’ and that of ‘direct participation’ therein. 
                                                                                                             
 64 Id. at 60-61 (footnotes omitted). 
 65 Id. at 54. 
 66 See generally Colombia: Recognition of Armed Conflict a Positive Step, 
ICTJ (May 12, 2011) https://www.ictj.org/news/colombia-recognition-armed-con
flict-positive-step. 
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While the concept of ‘hostilities’ refers to the (col-
lective) resort by the parties to the conflict to means 
and methods of injuring the enemy, ‘participation’ in 
hostilities refers to the (individual) involvement of a 
person in these hostilities.67 
Simply put, without a collective engaging in hostilities against 
the government, one single individual or criminal enterprise cannot 
be accused of being hostile. They are not attacking the government 
with intent to defeat an enemy, but rather breaching its legislation 
with intent to generate wealth. In essence, a declaration of hostility 
in time of peace is impossible. Use of lethal force under a status 
targeting standard, or any other manner outside the absolute neces-
sity criteria of human rights law, would simply amount to an extra-
judicial execution. In other words, in times of peace, violent acts are 
not hostile acts subject to lethal targeting, but criminal acts, subject 
to arrest and prosecution. 
4. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF “SHOOT-DOWN” LAWS 
Supporters of “Shoot-Down Laws” argue that they are mostly a 
dissuading tool that would seldom be used in practice. This was, for 
example, a significant component of the campaign in favor of ap-
proving Peru’s law.68 The argument, as it goes, states that criminal 
organizations would be less prone to use aircrafts for their illegal 
activities if they knew they can be shot down for doing so, thus re-
ducing crime altogether. 
As I mentioned above, however, air transportation is not an es-
sential component of cocaine flows in South America. If forced to 
choose alternative means of transportation, narco-traffickers would 
be entirely able to do so. And as with any economic choice, this 
decision will have both seen and unseen effects. Indeed, legal rules 
exist in order to change how the people affected by them act.69 The 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. at 43 (footnotes omitted). 
 68 Humala: ‘Ley Para Derribar Narcoavionetas en Perú es una Medida Di-
suasiva’, PERÚ21 (Aug. 22, 2015), http://peru21.pe/politica/humala-ley-derribar-
narcoavionetas-peru-medida-disuasiva-2225851. 
 69 DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH 
LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 3-4 (Princeton University Press 2000). 
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problem, however, is that legal rules do not always manage to create 
the result they intended, but instead create one entirely different that 
its drafters simply never foresaw. That is, for example, to some de-
gree, the case regarding minimum-wage laws. Legislators want to 
increase the wellbeing of workers. In practice however, there comes 
a point where any additional increase to the minimum wage would 
hurt, rather than help, workers, as it incentivizes businesses not to 
hire any additional workers. 
This same line of reasoning is applicable to “Shoot-Down” laws. 
While these laws intend to improve society by making narco-traf-
fickers stop transporting drugs, chances are narco-traffickers will 
adapt rather than stop. And the means through which they decide to 
adapt may be worse for society as a whole than the status quo. 
Take for example the usually undiscussed reality of non-state 
armed groups in the Andes region. In Peru, remnants of the Maoist 
Shining Path terrorist organization continue to operate in the coca 
producing valleys of the central Andes.70 In Colombia, both FARC 
terrorists and former (and supposedly de-mobilized) paramilitary 
forces known as bacrim or bandas criminales also operate in coca 
areas.71 Their presence provides narco-traffickers with a wide array 
of adaptation tools that defenders of “Shoot-Down” laws seldom 
discuss. Indeed, the main incentive “Shoot-Down” laws create for 
narco-traffickers is to even out the stakes: if authorities are now au-
thorized to shoot narco-traffic suspects, then they must make sure 
that not everyone inside the aircraft is guilty of narco-trafficking. It 
is not difficult to see narco-traffickers in the near future working 
closer with these other criminal organizations to secure kidnapped 
individuals to carry with them in their planes. Authorities would not 
be able to shoot down aircraft that contain innocent people inside. 
The status quo would continue, only this time, with kidnappings. 
Even if one assumes that “Shoot-Down” laws can incentivize 
narco-traffickers to abandon air-transportation altogether, however, 
it would be a mistake to assume that less planes means less drugs. 
                                                                                                             
 70 Shining Path, Tupac Amaru (Peru, leftists), COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC 
AFFAIRS (Sept. 28, 2008) http://www.coha.org/shining-path-tupac-amaru-peru-
leftists/. 
 71 See generally Bandas Criminales, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, http://web.sta
nford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/607 (last updated Aug. 
28, 2015). 
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Narco-traffickers will simply need to begin transporting the same 
amounts of drug though land, and, in order to do that, they will need 
to secure the collaboration of armed groups. This would empower 
and enrich such groups to the detriment of the civilian population, 
and simultaneously increase the point of sale price of cocaine once 
it arrives in the United States, making it a more profitable business. 
Instead of curving crime, “Shoot-Down” laws would incentivize 
new crimes without doing much to stifle the overall coca trade in the 
region. 
For these reasons, alternative measures must be explored: spe-
cifically, placing greater emphasis on multi-lateral cooperation. The 
three most relevant countries—Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru—have 
signed various bilateral and multilateral agreements on the fight 
against narco-trafficking, all of which require, in one way or an-
other, information sharing.72 Article IV of the Peru-Colombia agree-
ment states: “For the achievement of this agreement’s objectives, 
competent services will grant mutual technical-scientific assistance 
and shall exchange information on individual and associated pro-
ducers, processors and smugglers”.73 Article VII sets out an obliga-
                                                                                                             
 72 Convenio entre la República de Colombia y la República de Bolivia sobre 
Cooperación para el Control de Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes, Sustancias Si-
cotrópicas y Delitos Conexos, Prevención del Consumo, Rehabilitación y Desa-
rrollo Alternativo, Colom.-Bol., Mar. 12, 2001, available at http://apw.cancille-
ria.gov.co/Tratados/adjuntosTratados/BOLIVIA_B-CONVENIOCOOPSU
STANCIASPSICOTROPICAS2001-TEXTO.PDF [hereinafter Convenio entre 
Colombia y Bolivia]; Convenio entre la República del Perú y la República de 
Bolivia sobre Cooperación en Materia de Desarrollo Alternativo, Prevención del 
Consumo, Rehabilitación, Control del Tráfico Ilícito de Estupefacientes y Sustan-
cias Psicotrópicas y sus Delitos Conexos, Bol.-Peru, June 9, 2000, available at 
http://www.devida.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Bolivia-Convenio-de-
Cooperaci%C3%B3n-Bilateral.pdf [hereinafter Convenio entre Perú y Bolivia]; 
Convenio Administrativo entre la República Peruana y la República de Colombia 
para el Control, la Prevención y la Represión del Uso y Tráfico Ilícito de Sustan-
cias Estupefacientes y Sicotrópicas, Colom.-Peru, Mar. 30, 1979, available at 
http://www.devida.gob.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/1279-Convenio-Admi-
nistrativo-para-el-Control-la-Prevenci%C3%B3n-y-la-Represi%C3%B3n-del-
Uso-y-Tr%C3%A1fico-Ilicito . . . .pdf [hereinafter Convenio entre Perú y Colom-
bia]. 
 73 Convenio entre Perú y Colombia, supra note 72, at art. IV (translation from 
original text in Spanish: “Para el logro de los objetivos del presente Convenio, los 
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tion to cooperate whenever undertaking specific operations in fron-
tier areas, and Article XI establishes a Mixed Peru-Colombia Com-
mission in charge of advising both countries on which mechanisms 
and policies should be pursued.74 
While this is a pattern shared by the Colombia-Bolivia and Peru-
Bolivia agreements as well, not all agreements are as specific with 
regards to the issue of aircraft and the specific measures that should 
be taken to address the problem. The Colombia-Bolivia agreement, 
for example, requires the parties to merely “grant assistance for the 
exchange of information related to criminal modus operandi, routes, 
identification of individuals, methods to strengthen illicit drug traf-
ficking  . . .  with the objective of detecting organizations dedicated 
to illicit trafficking of drugs and psychotropic substances . . . “75 On 
the contrary, the Peru-Bolivia agreement specifically mentions air-
craft detection, stating that “the parties shall cooperate with one an-
other to provide information on the routes of ships and aircraft sus-
picious of being used for illicit drug-trafficking, psychotropic sub-
stances and other conducts  . . .  so that the competent authorities can 
adopt the measures they consider necessary.”76 
These different approaches to information sharing and bilateral 
cooperation as well as the general nature of obligations undertaken 
contribute to making aircraft interdiction a primarily domestic en-
deavor. The aircraft involved in narco-trafficking are short-range 
                                                                                                             
servicios competentes se otorgarán mutua asistencia técnico-científica, e inter-
cambiarán informaciones sobre productores, procesadores y traficantes individua-
les y asociados.”). 
 74 Id. at art. VII, art. XI. 
 75 Convenio entre Colombia y Bolivia, supra note 72, at art. II(3) (translation 
from original text in Spanish: “Las Partes se prestarán asistencia para el intercam-
bio de información relacionada con modalidades delictivas, rutas, identidades de 
personas, métodos para fortalecer el tráfico ilícito de drogas a que se refiere este 
Convenio, con el fin de detectar organizaciones dedicadas al tráfico ilícito de es-
tupefacientes y sustancias sicotrópicas . . . “). 
 76 Convenio entre Perú y Colombia, supra note 72, at art. II(2) (translation 
from original text in Spanish: “Las Partes cooperarán entre sí para brindarse in-
formación sobre rutas de naves y aeronaves de las que se sospeche están siendo 
utilizadas para el tráfico ilícito de estupefacientes, sustancias psicotrópicas y de-
más conductas descritas en el numeral 1 artículo 3 de la Convención, a fin de que 
las autoridades competentes puedan adoptar las medidas que consideren necesa-
rias.”). 
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vehicles that must land at some point. Shared intelligence and suffi-
cient allocated resources would be enough to be sure that an opera-
tion can be launched at the landing strip of choice. The problem for 
law enforcement is that they either do not have the means to conduct 
these sting operations or they have to lose track of the aircraft once 
it crosses an international border. Shooting it down is the simple way 
out of these problems, but it is also not the legal one. 
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and perhaps even Brazil, therefore, 
need to increase multilateral cooperation with regard to radar intel-
ligence and multinational sting operations. Procedures need to be 
harmonized and a permanent multilateral law enforcement organi-
zation or unit needs to be created to allow for effective cooperation. 
This way, when a Peruvian radar detects a suspicious aircraft and 
moves to intercept it, it can call upon its Bolivian counterpart to loi-
ter nearby the border and continue pursuing until it lands, where law 
enforcement agents can later conduct the arrest. In the same vein, 
better radar technology can be used to preventively detect and de-
stroy illegal landing strips used by narco-traffickers. 
Latin American governments have created similar task forces for 
various important topics in the past. The Permanent Commission for 
the South Pacific, which integrates Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Ec-
uador, seeks to coordinate “regional maritime policies in order to 
adopt concerted positions of its Member States  . . .  in international 
negotiations, development of the Law of the Sea, International En-
vironmental Law and other multilateral initiatives”.77 Other exam-
                                                                                                             
 77 Regional Fishery Bodies Summary Descriptions: Permanent Commission 
for the South Pacific (CPPS), FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/cpps/en (last visited Dec. 28, 2016) (ex-
plaining that the Permanent Commission for the South Pacific was established 
through the Declaration of Santiago in 1952 by the States of Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru. Its role is to coordinate regional maritime policies in interna-
tional negotiations, development of the Law of the Sea, International Environ-
mental Law and other multilateral initiatives). 
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ples, set up at the United Nations level, include the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America78 and the Latin American and Caribbean 
Forestry Commission.79 
An inter-governmental regional organization that tackles aerial 
drug intervention on a permanent basis would address the issues di-
rectly and have a broader impact in the region, as it would be able 
to integrate security policies with local development initiatives and 
demand suppression strategies. 
5. A FOREWARNED WAR 
If a militarized policy of responding to criminal activity with le-
thal force is continued, however, it will only be a matter of time 
before one of these cases reaches international fora; specifically, the 
Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS). The IAHRS is 
comprised of two bodies, the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR), and is one of the most renowned and respected 
                                                                                                             
 78 The Economic Commission for Latin America was created by Economic 
and Social Council resolution 106(VI) with the purpose of contributing with the 
economic development of the region. The Member States of the Commission are: 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
United States, France, Germany, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Italia, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Portugal, United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, Republic of Korea, 
Dominican Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Saint 
Lucia, Spain, Suriname, Trinidad y Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. See About 
ECLAC, ECONOMIC COMM’N FOR LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN, 
http://www.cepal.org/en/about (last visited Dec. 28, 2016). 
 79 In 1948 the Latin American and Caribbean Forestry Commission was es-
tablished by FAO to provide a policy and technical forum to discuss forest issues 
on a regional basis. The State Members of the Commission are: Antigua and Bar-
buda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, United States, France, Granada, Guate-
mala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nor-
way, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, United Kingdom, Dominican Republic, 
Saint Kitts y Nevis, San Vicente y las Granadinas, Saint Lucia, Suriname, Trini-
dad y Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. See Latin American and Caribbean For-
estry Commission, FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/31106/en/ (last updated Feb. 27 2015). 
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human rights protection systems in the world.80 Its jurisprudence has 
been instrumental for the elaboration and development of doctrines 
related to forced disappearances as a human rights violation,81 the 
responsibility of the state for the actions of non-state armed 
groups,82 reparations,83 the illegality of military trials,84 and the un-
enforceability of blanket amnesty laws.85 Throughout this vast juris-
prudence, however, one thing is manifestly clear: use of lethal force 
by law enforcement officials must be ultima ratio. 
As stated above, the IACHR recognizes the human rights stand-
ard of absolute necessity.86 This standard directly contradicts the 
policy set out by “Shoot-Down” laws. These laws do not limit the 
downing of civilian aircraft to extraordinary circumstances, but ra-
ther merely to situations of suspicion of a crime. They also do not 
establish an “absolutely necessary” standard, given that by defini-
tion it is not absolutely necessary to shoot down an airplane when 
one can arrest the crew upon landing. 
While there is no precedent that deals with the exact same situ-
ation, the case of Armando Alejandre & others v. Cuba can offer 
some insights.87. That case deals with the 1996 downing of an Amer-
                                                                                                             
 80 Christina Binder, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, 12 GER. L. J. 1203, 1203 (2011) (stating that ‘[t]he Inter-
American Court of Human Rights has proven a particularly active defender of 
human rights in Latin America’ and that ‘[l]egal scholars have praised the Inter-
American Court for its effective protection of human rights’) (footnote omitted). 
 81 Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 7, ¶ 7 (July 21, 1989), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec
_07_ing.pdf (citing paragraph 2 of the Resolution of Jan. 20, 1989). 
 82 Id. 
 83 See generally Thomas Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights 
Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351 (2008), available at http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.ed
u/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1313&context=faculty. 
 84 Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 52, ¶ 132 (May 30, 1999), http://www.corteidh
.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_52_ing.pdf. 
 85 Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C.) No. 
75, ¶ 1 (Mar. 14, 2001), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_
75_ing.pdf. 
 86 Zambrano Vélez et al. v. Ecuador, supra note 51, at ¶ 84. 
 87 See Armando Alejandre Jr., Carlos Costa, Mario de la Peña, and Pablo Mo-
rales v. Cuba, Case 11.589, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. Report No. 86/99, 
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ican civilian aircraft looking for Cuban rafters in international wa-
ters by the Cuban air force.88 Without any justification and without 
warning, the Cuban air force simply scrambled Mig-29 fighter jets 
and opened fire, killing all the occupants.89 
The IACHR stated in its report on the merits that “[these] actions 
were a clear violation of established international rules, which re-
quire all measures to be exhausted before resorting to aggression 
against any airplanes and utterly forbid the use of force against ci-
vilian aircraft.”90 
In any case, “Shoot-Down” laws seem to be gaining increasing 
levels of attention.91 It is therefore unlikely that the IAHRS would 
consider them legal in any way, and, in all likelihood, a government 
accused of shooting down a civilian airplane would decidedly lose 
its case. 
This is important because, as of late, the IAHRS has been under 
much pressure from unsatisfied governments that complain the sys-
tem is biased against them and that it is impossible for them to re-
ceive a fair trial. In 2012, for example, Venezuela denounced the 
Pact of San José, the agreement granting jurisdiction to the IACHR, 
accusing the Court of being “held captive by a small group of callous 
bureaucrats who have blocked, hampered, and prevented necessary 
changes.”92 Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, has in turn com-
                                                                                                             
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.106 doc.3 (1999), https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/M
erits/Cuba11.589.htm. 
 88 Id. at ¶ 1 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at ¶ 8. 
 91 Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, supra note 54, at ¶ 31-32 
(arguing that “While many States have reformed their laws during the last few 
decades to give greater expression to the international rules and standards . . . in 
some cases, progress that has been made is under threat . . . There is a danger that 
laws such as the one recently adopted by Honduras entitling the State to shoot 
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plained about alleged bias at the heart of the Inter-American Sys-
tem,93 while Brazil got in a spat with the Commission when it or-
dered a halt in the construction of the multi-million dollar Belo 
Monte Dam project.94 
All of these problems have led several states to promote pro-
found reform proposals that in some instances threaten to weaken 
the independence of the system.95 They have also withheld contri-
butions to the system96 to the point of risking its bankruptcy and 
massive layoffs.97 
The aforementioned analysis with regards to “Shoot-Down” 
laws can give context to these heated accusations. After all, in many 
instances, the alleged bias revolves around cases where govern-
ments specifically went against clear-cut prohibitions in interna-
tional human rights law or in the long-held jurisprudence of the 
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Court. None of these cases, not Ecuador’s lack of respect for free-
dom of expression,98 nor Venezuela’s disregard for political dis-
sent,99 nor Brazil’s negligence with indigenous rights was an unpre-
dictable or extraordinary result. These cases were more the result of 
governments ignoring existing law, rather than an overreaching 
Court. 
The same problem is beginning to arise with “Shoot-Down” 
laws. South American governments are designing a legal regime 
manifestly incompatible with Inter-American case law. These laws 
are destined to be deemed unlawful at the IAHRS, yet these states 
insist on pursuing them. When the time comes, once the cases are 
lost and the laws are annulled by the IACtHR, they will accuse it of 
bias. This is, for all intents and purposes, a forewarned war, and 
“guerra avisada, no mata gente.” 
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